So Much For The Surge

With Petraus scheduled to testify to Congress, Spencer Ackerman does as well as anyone summing up how the Sadr Fighting Marks Surge Limits.

"Across the southern port city of Basra and in eastern Baghdad's restive, 3 million-people-strong Shiite slum -- known as Sadr City -- Iraqi soldiers and police launched a campaign of suppression against Sadr's Mahdi Army militia. Maliki initially demanded the Mahdi Army disarm within three days. But the resiliency of Sadr's militiamen -- many of whom have infiltrated the government security forces -- forced Maliki to relax his deadline. On Sunday, the government accepted a ceasefire almost entirely on Sadr's terms: brokered by an Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani (who, McClatchy reported, is on the Treasury Department's terrorist watch-list), the Mahdi Army will retain its weapons. Further negotiations will take place in the Iranian city of Qom, where Sadr will receive Maliki's emissaries.

The nearly week-long fighting left hundreds dead. March saw nearly 1000 civilians dead across Iraq -- an increase of 30 percent over February. February, in turn, saw its own 30 percent increase in civilian casualties over January.

'The fact is, the ISF [Iraqi security forces] couldn't fulfill a major campaign against an insurgent group on its own,' said a U.S. intelligence analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. 'I personally think that's the real story. The ISF, despite the surge, and despite the [rhetoric from the Bush administration that] 'they'll stand up as we stand down,' couldn't fulfill their core requirement.'

'In spite of holding de jure power, Maliki can't exert territorial control over even the Shiite regions of Iraq,' said Robert Farley, a professor at the University of Kentucky's Paterson School of Diplomacy. 'While the surge has reduced violence, it has failed utterly to create Iraqi state capacity. The Iraqi central government is as far as ever from exerting control over other armed groups within Iraq.'

Brandon Friedman, who served in Iraq as an infantry officer with the 101st Airborne Division in 2003 (commanded at the time by Petraeus), disagreed. 'It’s very clear now that -- after five years of American training and assistance -- the militias still wield more power and influence than any national, organized Iraqi military or police force,' Friedman, who edits the veterans' advocacy blog VetVoice.com, wrote in an e-mail. 'This is exactly what both Maliki and the Bush administration were trying to disprove last week. Unfortunately for them, they only succeeded in showing how inept and dependent the Maliki government is on outside forces.'

No matter what, however, the Bush administration insists that the surge is a success in the face of all evidence because to do otherwise would be to admit a blunder. And this administration has no record of admitted to an error."